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ABSTRACT
A hardware security solution using a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a
promising approach to ensure security for physical systems. PUF utilizes the
inherent instance-specific parameters of physical objects and it is evaluated based
on the performance parameters such as uniqueness, reliability, randomness, and
tamper evidence of the Challenge and Response Pairs (CRPs). These performance
parameters are affected by operating conditions such as temperature and supply
voltage variations. In addition, PUF implementation on Field Programmable Gate
Array (FPGA) platform is proven to be more complicated than PUF implementation
on Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) technologies. The automatic
placement and routing of logic cells in FPGA can affect the performance of PUFs
due to path delay imbalance.
In this work, the impact of power supply and temperature variations, on the
reliability of an arbiter PUF is studied. Simulation results are conducted to determine
the effects of these varying conditions on the CRPs. Simulation results show that ±
10% of power supply variation can affect the reliability of an arbiter PUF by about
51%, similarly temperature fluctuation between -40 0C and +60 0C reduces the PUF
reliability by 58%. In addition, a new methodology to implement a reliable arbiter
PUF on an FPGA platform is presented. Instead of using an extra delay measurement
module, the Chip Planner tool for FPGA is used for manually placement to minimize
the path delay misalignment to less than 8 ps.

vi

DEDICATION

Education is not the learning of the facts,
But the training of the mind to think!
– Albert Einstein

I dedicate my work to my loving parents, Mr. Bhupinder Singh and Mrs. Harjeet
Kaur; my brothers, Manipal Singh and Damanpal Singh; and my friend, Preet
Inder Singh. Thank you for always being there and their love. Thank you for the
indestructible wealth of all time. I would also like to thank my supervisor, Dr.
Rashidzadeh for his guidance and support.

vii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to sincerely thank my supervisor, Dr. Rashid Rashidzadeh, for his
guidance and support in successfully completing my thesis. I am deeply grateful for
his involvement, guiding, mentoring and providing any help that I needed to
complete my degree. It is an honor to have worked under his supervision.
I am grateful to my co-supervisor, Dr. Roberto Muscedere for his support and
valuable comments which helped in completing this thesis.
I would also like to thank my committee members, Dr. Huapeng Wu and Dr. Jeff
Defoe for their encouragement, constructive comments and positive criticism which
in fact, improved my ideas and solutions.
I would like to extend my gratitude to my colleagues at the Research Centre for
Integrated Microsystems (RCIM). I appreciate their friendship, support,
encouragement, their constant involvement and valuable feedbacks.
Finally, I would like to thank the research and financial support received from
Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) of Canada and
Canadian Microelectronics Corporation (CMC) Microsystems.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION OF CO-AUTHORSHIP / PREVIOUS PUBLICATION .....iii
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................ vi
DEDICATION....................................................................................................... vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................ viii
LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................................. xii
LIST OF TABLE…………………………………………………..……………xvi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/SYMBOLS......................................................... xvi
Chapter-1 Introduction .......................................................................................... 1
1.1 Motivation ....................................................................................................... 2
1.2 Security and Test ............................................................................................. 3
1.2.1 Software Security ..................................................................................... 3
1.2.2 Hardware Security .................................................................................... 4
1.3 What is PUF? .................................................................................................. 7
1.3.1 The PUF Concept ..................................................................................... 7
1.3.2 Challenge and Response ........................................................................... 7
1.4 Research Objective .......................................................................................... 8
1.5 Outline of Thesis ............................................................................................. 9
1.6 References ..................................................................................................... 10
Chapter-2 Physical Unclonable Function Concept and Background .............. 12
2.1 Previous Work ............................................................................................... 12

ix

2.2 PUF Construction .......................................................................................... 14
2.3 PUF Properties .............................................................................................. 14
2.3.1 Uniqueness.............................................................................................. 14
2.3.2 Reliability ............................................................................................... 15
2.3.3 Randomness ............................................................................................ 16
2.3.4 Tamper Evidence (Security) ................................................................... 17
2.4 PUF Hamming Distance ............................................................................... 17
2.4.1 Intra-distance .......................................................................................... 17
2.4.2 Inter-distance .......................................................................................... 18
2.5 Classification of PUFs................................................................................... 18
2.6 PUF Implementation ..................................................................................... 20
2.6.1 Arbiter PUF ............................................................................................ 20
2.6.2 Lightweight Secure PUF ........................................................................ 21
2.6.3 Feed Forward Arbiter PUFs ................................................................... 22
2.6.4 Ring Oscillator PUFs .............................................................................. 23
2.6.5 SRAM PUFs ........................................................................................... 24
2.7 PUF Applications .......................................................................................... 26
2.7.1 Low-Cost Authentication ....................................................................... 26
2.7.2 Cryptographic Key Generation ............................................................... 28
2.8 Summary………………………………………………………………...….29
2.9 References ..................................................................................................... 30
Chapter-3 Reliability of Physical Unclonable Function under Temperature and
Supply Voltage Variations ................................................................................... 34
3.1

Introduction .............................................................................................. 34
x

3.2

Effect of Temperature Variation on PUF Reliability ............................... 37

3.3

Effect of Supply voltage variation on PUF Reliability ............................ 42

3.4

Simulation Results.................................................................................... 43

3.5

Conclusion................................................................................................ 49

3.6

References ................................................................................................ 50

Chapter-4 APUF Implementation on FPGA Platform...................................... 52
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 52
4.2 Altera EP2C5................................................................................................. 53
4.3 Cyclone II LE Architecture ........................................................................... 53
4.4 Design Requirements and Implementation ................................................... 54
4.5 Experimental Results..................................................................................... 62
4.6 Conclusion..................................................................................................... 67
4.7 References ..................................................................................................... 68
Chapter-5 Conclusions and Future Work .......................................................... 69
5.1 Summary ....................................................................................................... 69
5.2 Conclusion………………………………………………………………….70
5.3 Future Work .................................................................................................. 70
APPENDIX: IEEE PERMISSION TO REPRINT…………………………….71
VITA AUCTORIS ................................................................................................ 72

xi

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1 Hardware threat points…………………………………………………5
Figure 1.2 Challenge and response pair system ........................................................ 8
Figure 2.1 Unique response for even same challenge applied ................................ 15
Figure 2.2 Reliability to achieve same response for same challenge applied under
fluctuating environmental conditions ..................................................................... 16
Figure 2.3 Classification of PUFs ........................................................................... 19
Figure 2.4 APUF basic model ................................................................................. 20
Figure 2.5 Lightweight Secure PUF structure ........................................................ 22
Figure 2.6 Feed-forward arbiter PUF...................................................................... 23
Figure 2.7 RO PUF structure .................................................................................. 24
Figure 2.8 (a) Logic circuit of SRAM PUF (b) Electrical circuit of SRAM cell ... 25
Figure 2.9 Applications of PUF .............................................................................. 26
Figure 2.10 Unclonable RFIDs approach to authentication ................................... 27
Figure 2.11 Cryptographic key generation using PUF [29] .................................... 28
Figure 3.1 Effect of setup/hold time on proper operation of arbiter………….......36
Figure 3.2 (a) A two port network representing a multiplexer. (b) Its equivalent noise
free circuit. (c) The equivalent circuit connected to a source………………………38
xii

Figure 3.3 Effect of noise on propagation delay of a multiplexer. (a) Without noise
where the propagation delay is fixed. (b) With noise where the propagation delay
varies between Min and Max values………………………………………………40
Figure 3.4 Noise response of a multiplexer. (a) Power spectral density. (b) Noise
power. (c) rms noise voltage………………………………………………………42
Figure 3.5 Simulation results to evaluate the effect of process variations on the
propagation delay of a multiplexer. (a) Output response of a MUX to an input
indicating different propagations delay for FF, TT and SS corners. (b) Output
response of a delay line containing ten multiplexers indicating propagation delay
variations at different corners…………………………………………………......44
Figure 3.6 Effect of supply voltage variation on propagation delay of logic gates. (a)
A multiplexer. (b) A delay line containing ten multiplexers……………………….45
Figure 3.7 Reliability reduction for an arbiter PUF due to 10% supply voltage
variation...........................................................................................................……46
Figure 3.8 Propagation delay versus temperature for a delay line containing 10
multiplexers……………………………………………………………………….47
Figure 3.9 Reduction in area due to temperature variation……………………….47
Figure 3.10 Simple circuit of supply-independent………………………………..48
Figure 4.1 Cyclone II logic element structure [4]………………………………….54

xiii

Figure 4.2 (a) Elementary symbol of delay cell (b) Symbol compact pair of 2-1 MUX
whose inputs are cross connected and selectors are connected together ................ 55
Figure 4.3 RTL view of 64-bit challenge with 1- bit response ............................... 56
Figure 4.4 Resource property editor window view of delay cell and DFF ............. 57
Figure 4.5 Effect of routing at different sections .................................................... 57
Figure 4.6 Random placing of MUX and arbiter element on the chip planner……..59
Figure 4.7 Design after partition in LLR ................................................................ 60
Figure 4.8 Result of one manual placement............................................................ 61
Figure 4.9 Cyclone II FPGA board used for testing ............................................... 62
Figure 4.10 Result of propagation delay for random and fixed 16-bit PUF ........... 63
Figure 4.11 Probability of observing ‘1’ as response after locking them at fixed
places for five PUFs ................................................................................................ 64
Figure 4.12 Probability of observing ‘1’ as response bit for random challenges
versus 5 response bits.............................................................................................. 65
Figure 4.13 Hamming distance of output response bits .......................................... 66

xiv

LIST OF TABLE

Table 1: Comparison with pervious work…………………………………………66

xv

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/SYMBOLS
Abbreviations/Symbols

Description

API

Application Programming Interface

APUF

Arbiter PUF

C

Challenge

CPUF

Controlled PUF

CRP

Challenge Response Pair

DFF

Delay Flip-Flop

DL

Delay Line

DP

Design Partition

ECC

Error Correcting Code

FF

Fast-Fast

FPGA

Field-Programmable Gate Array

HD

Hamming Distance

IC

Integrated Circuit

I/O

Input/Output

IP

Intellectual Property

xvi

IoTs

Internet of Things

JTAG

Joint Test Active Group

LABs

Logic Array Blocks

LE

Logic Element

LFSR

Linear Feedback Shift Register

LLR

Logic Locked Region

LUT

Look Up Table

Max

Maximum value

Min

Minimum value

MUX

Multiplexer

OS

Operating System

PAR

Placement-and-Routing

PDL

Programmable Delay Lines

POK

Physically Obfuscated Key

PUF

Physical Unclonable Functions

PVT

Process Voltage Temperature

R

Response

xvii

RFIDs

Radio Frequency Identifications

ROPUF

Ring Oscillator PUF

rms

Root Mean Square

RTL

Register Transfer Level

SRAM

Static Random Access Memory

SS

Slow-Slow

TERO

Transient Element Ring Oscillators

TT

Typical-Typical

USB

Universal Serial Bus

xviii

Chapter -1
Introduction

Internet of Things (IoTs) is a network of physical devices which enables data exchange in
real-time between objects. IoT has emerged as one of the promising technologies that has
the potential to affect the lives of billions of people. However, the potential of IoT
technology will not be fully materialized if a robust solution is not developed for IoT
security. Due to the large number of connecting IoT devices, their wide applications and
impact on everyday life, even a minor security breach can be a major problem. For
example, if a connected car is hacked by a third party, it can be remotely controlled which
may result in unwanted acceleration and deceleration and in worst cases, loss of life. The
security needs to be built inside the design and each IoT device has to be uniquely identified
[1].
There is at present a rapid increase in susceptibilities per devices due to the dependency on
the technology such as software installed on devices. The main concerns are listed as follow
[2]:
1. Privacy concerns: Research reports indicate that about 90% of devices hold a
minimum of one piece of private information either due to the device or the applications
installed on it. It can include name, address, date of birth, usernames, passwords, and
credit card information.
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2. Insufficient Authentication: Most of the people save their passwords in their devices
and these passwords can get stored on the cloud. These passwords are usually user’s
name or date of birth which can easily be hacked by simple techniques.
3. Transport Encryption: Encryption is a technique to encode the information, however,
about 70% of devices use unencrypted network services.
4. Web Interface: It is the interface between a user and the software running on the
server. Signing web pages using default credentials can help hackers to identify valid
credentials and take advantage of them.
The software based security alone may not be sufficient to handle security concerns of IoT
enabled networks. Hardware of a product at the design stage needs to be secure and be
reinforced by software level security.
1.1 Motivation
The cost of in-house fabrication is too expensive and most companies rely on a foreign
semiconductor foundries for IC fabrication. This potentially poses a security threat since
the factories are provided with the design details and they can secretly add hardware
infection to the main design. Encryption is a known method which is widely used for secure
data transmission [3]. A private key is used for encryption, however, it is susceptible to
malicious attacks and the private key can be retrieved by adversaries through timing and
power consumption analysis known as side channel attacks [4].
A solution for the above mentioned problem is to generate the key on the fly to make the
system secure and resilient against attacks. Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a
hardware security module which can be used to generate secret keys for authentication. By
2

using these secure keys, PUF can also be used to develop security solutions for portable
wireless communication devices including IoT sensors. This can be done by not storing the
secrets in the smart meters and instead generating them at the time when authentication is
required using PUF technology [5].
1.2 Security and Test
Security of communication networks is a top priority. In the modern digital world, the
traditional security techniques are no longer sufficient to adequately enable trusted
interaction [6]. The need for security among information processing and communication
systems have risen exponentially because confidential information is stored over the
Internet and other networks.
1.2.1 Software Security
Software security is a system which involves building secure mechanisms and making
system robust. In other words, security is implemented to protect the software against
hacking or other malicious attacks. Malicious harmful files or a programs are used to
suspect the user’s information, which includes virus, worms, trojan and spyware.
A Virus is a piece of code which copies itself and becomes part of the code. It spreads from
one device to another, it can damage the data of the device and also get attached to
executable files. Worms are similar to viruses and cause damage to data. Worms are
standalone software, so do not require a host program to run. Trojans are another type of
malware which can delete or modify data, steal personal information, or activate other
malware. They can also create hidden doors for an attacker to access the system. Spyware
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is like a trojan which collects the user information without his/her awareness. Once
installed on a device, it can monitor user’s activities and gather credentials.
In addition, these malicious attacks can affect the normal operation of a system and if the
infected system is in a network, other systems in that network are susceptible to an attack
through the infected system. However, there are many security solutions against these
malwares such as antivirus, encryption, firewall and spyware removal software [7]. This
security software is limited to software-based attacks and cannot resist the hardware attacks
which can significantly affect the operation of a system and requires the study and need to
secure hardware systems.
1.2.2 Hardware Security
Hardware security refers to the protection of physical system(s) against malicious attacks.
A hardware security module is a physical system used to safeguard and maintain strong
authentication. It is believed that hardware is more secure as compared to software. Some
of the reasons are as follows:
1. Hardware is well tested and certified in laboratories.
2. There is a limited access to the system and it is strictly controlled by internal rules.
3. It has security-focused operating system. OS is a software which manages the hardware
and software of the device and also provide some common services.
However, if an attacker can disassemble the hardware module, then important information
can be extracted. A number of attacks on hardware are reported through micro probing,
reverse engineering and side channel analysis. Moreover, outsourcing presents a security
threat as well.
4

IP Vendor

System
Integrator

Manufacture

Figure 1.1 Hardware threats points

As mentioned in Section 1.1 that due to high cost of fabrication, design is sent out of
company. Due to the outsourcing of the design, trust on the security of hardware built can
be lost at any point. For example, to complete the hardware module, design moves from
one point to another as shown in Figure 1.1. IP core is a block of data or logic which
provides more options for designing. However, the security issue comes across the thirdparty IP cores where it can be misused. A system integrator is a person or a company that
build systems for customers by combining hardware, software, and products from multiple
vendors. Security of the system integrator risks due to the smart devices present on the
floor through which information can be leaked to unwanted systems. Manufacturer is an
arrangement to produce goods like integrated circuits. Manufacturer can fabricate more
number of ICs or can modify the design by adding wanted circuit which can leak the
5

information. A large number of side-channel attacks and trojan injection has been reported
at these points. Hence, it is necessary to prevent ICs from the third party theft, piracy and
overproduction.
However, there are some methods such as watermarking and hardware metering to stop the
overproduction of chips and to make them secure against malicious attacks. These
techniques and their respective disadvantages are explained below.


Hardware metering was introduced against the overproduction and piracy of the IC’s.
It is a set of security protocols enabled by IP owner to achieve post-fabrication control.
It helps the owner to track and identify the design post fabrication. Using the active
metering, not only the identification can be performed but also the designer can lock or
unlock the functionality. The drawback of passive metering method is that it is not
strong enough to protect designs against overproduction [8].



Digital Watermark is a mark used to identify the ownership or to verify the
authenticity of a carrier signal. However, this technique is vulnerable to attacks. A
possible threat is that the same data can be watermarked multiple times and distributed.
Fraudulent data can be created to combine different watermarked copies [6].



Hardware Trojan has emerged as a major concern for IC manufacturing. It is a hidden
circuit inserted by adversaries in a chip to modify existing circuits and affect their
functionalities, reduce the reliability or extract valuable information. A hardware
module which is infected by a Trojan can leak confidential information [9].
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1.3 What is PUF?
A physical unclonable function (PUF) is a hardware security module which is generally
considered as a random variable. It relies on physical characteristics of integrated circuits
(ICs) to generate unique signatures. It is a one-way function in which an output is produced
by an input, but the input cannot be determined from the output. PUF was first introduced
by Pappu in 2002, when he observed the unique speckle patterns on a transparent epoxy
wafer filled with bubbles upon shining it with a laser [10]. Silicon based PUF was then
introduced by Gassend et al. [11].
1.3.1 The PUF Concept
The fundamental concept behind the PUF technology is the variation that occurs in an IC
characteristic due to the process variations during the manufacturing. The manufacturing
process variations are minute, unavoidable, completely random and difficult to control.
PUF takes advantage of these random variations to generate a unique and random set for
each fabricated device. PUF behaves like a random function which generates random
values. These random values are unpredictable for an attacker even if they have physical
access.
1.3.2 Challenge and Response
The input of a PUF is called challenge and the output generated is called response. PUF is
interrogated by a set of challenges to generate a unique set of responses. The set of
challenge-response pairs (CRPs) is used to uniquely identify a device. Figure 1.2 shows
the block diagram of a PUF. PUF core circuit is used to generate output when input is
applied to it, where input and output randomizer are to add security. An error correction
7

scheme is implemented to correct the errors of the raw responses. These error correction
scheme can be hamming codes or syndrome codes [12].

Challenge

Input
Randomizer

PUF
Core

Error
Correction

Output
Randomizer

Response

Figure 1.2 Challenge and Response pair system

1.4 Research Objective
The objective of this research is to analyze the reliability of an arbiter PUF under supply
and temperature variation. In addition, the effect of rigid FPGA structure of PUF
implementation is studied.
The key contributions from this thesis are:
1. The impact of supply voltage and temperature variations cannot be ignored as it can
affect the performance parameters of PUF significantly. Moreover, these variations can
also reduce the number of reliable CRPs of a PUF to less than 42%.
2. To implement a circuit like PUF on FPGA requires symmetry, which can be done by
manual placing the circuit elements. In addition, the location and the delay imbalance
can be observed using Chip Planner instead of using an extra hardware module. The
positions of the logic elements can be fixed using LogicLock Region and Design
Partition within the Chip Planner.
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1.5 Outline of Thesis
This thesis is organized as follows:


In Chapter 2, The published research works in the field of PUF and its implementation
methods are covered. Then PUF structure, different properties of PUF, classification of
existing PUFs along with their circuits and its application are explained.



In Chapter 3, A delay based arbiter PUF is implemented in the Cadence Virtuoso
environment using 0.18µm CMOS technology to study the effects of supply and
temperature variations on PUF performance parameters. The simulation results are
presented in the form of meaningful waveforms and plots for PUF performance
evaluation. Additionally, we analyzed the reduction of challenge response pairs (CRP)
set under the varying operating conditions. The results out of this work has been
accepted for publication in the 61st IEEE International Midwest Symposium on
Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS) 2018.



In Chapter 4, An APUF is implemented on an FPGA platform to analyze the effects
of FPGA rigid structure on its performance parameters. To minimize the effect, a new
practically feasible and easy to implement method has been presented.



In Chapter 5, This chapter summarizes the results and presents potential area of
research for future work.
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Chapter -2
Physical Unclonable Function
Concept and Background

PUF is an expression of an inherent and unclonable instance-specific feature of a physical
object. It is a physically disordered system which is intentionally designed to become a
function of process variation to produce random response when offered an input challenge.
The security of a PUF is based on wire delays, gate delays, and quantum mechanical
fluctuations. PUF response values are observed at three dimensions in an array: (i)

Responses from different PUF instances,

(ii)

Responses from the same PUF but on different challenges, and

(iii)

Responses from the same PUF on same challenges.

2.1 Previous Work
The idea of using complex unclonable features of a physical system using mesoscopic
physics of coherent light transport for security measures was discovered in 2002 by Pappu
et al. in [1]. Then Gassend et al. in [2] exploited delay variations and measured transient
responses to generate multiple CRPs for identification and authentication of an IC. They
proposed linear arbiter PUF which operates based on the race between the rising edges and
this is more explained in Section 2.6.1. However, arbiter PUF was vulnerable to numerous
attacks, for instance, invasive attacks, in which attacker tries to remove the package and
layers of IC, or non-invasive attacks, in which adversary determines the key by observing
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the power or by simulating the IC. Further work done by Majzoobi et al. in [3] introduced
the formal methodology for testing the security of PUFs using four different test methods
such as (1) predictability, (2) collision, (3) sensitivity, and (4) reverse-engineering. The
offline and software-based testing paved the way for understanding the PUF. Maiti et al.
in [4] extended the work by adding evaluation of parameters such as reliability, bit-aliasing
and probability of misidentification.
PUFs are not only implemented on Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) [5] but
also on FPGA platform. The advantage of implementing design on FPGA platform is that
it is easy to modify. Morozov et al. in [6] and Majzoobi et al. in [7] implemented delaybased PUFs on FPGAs and found the implementation challenging due to the routing
constraints and arbiter element violation. Majzoobi et al. in [8] proposed a novel approach
of using programmable delay lines (PDL) against asymmetries in routing on FPGA. For
the delay measurement, they used timing characterization circuit, by sweeping the clock
frequency they monitored the rate of timing error then added tuning blocks to cancel out
the biasing caused by routing constraints and achieved 9ps on average resolution for each
inverter. Takanori et al. in [9] proposed 3-1 double arbiter PUF to improve the uniqueness
of responses to approximately 50%. To improve the reliability under noisy condition,
Yuejiang et al. in [10] used machine learning algorithm by selectively choosing CRPs.
They successfully improved the reliability to 96.91% under the same setting.
However, the detail analysis on how various operating conditions such as temperature and
supply voltage variations, can affect the reliability and CRP’s of PUF has not been
reported. Therefore, we performed a detailed analysis on these operating conditions and
their effect on PUF performance. The result of this work has been presented in Chapter 3.
13

Literature presented PUF implementation on FPGA platform, which requires an extra
hardware module to measure the delay imbalance. What if, the measurement delay module
is needs calibration or is not ideal. Therefore, we presented a new methodology to
implement APUF on FPGA platform in chapter 4, without the requirement of an extra
delay measurement module.
2.2 PUF Construction
The claim to construct unclonable instance is discovered in the fabrication technique
limitations of physical objects. These variations occurring at (sub) microscopic level with
high accuracy can be used to distinguish physical objects by generating random signatures
[3]. PUF takes the advantage of these variations to generate unique random values and
secret keys.
2.3 PUF Properties
PUF performance is evaluated based on four important parameters, namely uniqueness,
reliability, randomness, and security (tamper evident). These performance parameters are
discussed below.
2.3.1 Uniqueness
Uniqueness is a basic property of PUF which is used to ensure no two PUF chips and their
CRP’s are identical even if they have the same design layout and technology. Figure 2.1
indicates that even if the same challenge sets are applied to different PUFs, the response
generated by them will be different. Ideally, the CRPs need to be 100% uncorrelated across
the chip. The hamming distance (HD) between the responses obtained from different
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Figure 2.1 Unique response for even same challenge applied
instances of PUF is used to evaluate a PUF. For an ideal PUF circuit, the hamming distance
need to be 0.5 (i.e. 50%) between the obtained responses. To achieve a high level of
uniqueness, large process variation is required with minimum systematic biasing to make
it unpredictable [11], [12], [13].
2.3.2 Reliability
Reliability is the ability to generate the same response for a known challenge even in the
presence of noise and other operating condition variations as shown in Figure 2.2. The
probability of getting the same response ideally needs to be 100%. The delay and the power
consumption of a circuit are a function of the supply voltage and temperature fluctuations,
which can affect the CRPs. These fluctuations can result in a different response set for the
same challenge applied to a given PUF instance. Reliability can be measured by
Figure 2. 1 Unique response for even same challenge applied
determining the intra-Hamming Distance (HD) of a PUF because intra-distance is
calculated for the same challenge applied to the same PUF instance. Ideally, inter-chip HD
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Same
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Response, R
(No affect of
Operating
Conditions)
Figure 2.2 Reliability to achieve same response for same challenge applied under
fluctuating environmental conditions
should be zero, it means that the total number of bit errors rate for CRP should be zero at
any stage even at varying operating conditions [14], [15].
2.3.3 Randomness
Randomness is a measure of unpredictability of a PUF response. It can be measured based
on how biased the response bits are towards ‘1’ or ‘0’ in the entire response data set and in
the different slices of the data set. Minimum systematic biasing in the circuit results in a
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high value of randomness. Hence, the probability of achieving ‘1’ or ‘0’ at the output needs
to be 50%.
2.3.4 Tamper Evidence (Security)
The key concept of PUF is that it is impossible to build a duplicate of a PUF instance.
Under tampering, permanent changes can be made to the integrity of a PUF entity. Tamper
evident for PUF stands for the fact that if reverse engineering or micro-probing is done on
a PUF, the PUF gets damaged to such an extent that it starts producing wrong responses
for the same set of input challenges.
2.4 PUF Hamming Distance
Hamming Distance (HD) is a parameter to calculate the number of different elements of
two strings of the same length. Inter-device and intra-device distances are the two
important metrics which are used to categorize the uniqueness and robustness of a PUF
responses. Variation in surrounding conditions such as temperature, supply voltage and
aging can affect the inter-device and intra-device distances between the PUF responses.
Large inter-device and small intra-device distances are required to achieve an ideal PUF
[16].
2.4.1 Intra-hamming distance
A PUF response intra-hamming distance is a distance between two PUF responses from
the same PUF instance using same challenge. In an ideal case, HD between the responses
should differ by 50% of the total response set, on changing a bit in the challenge set. The
intra-HD can be calculated by:
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𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎 =

1
𝑘

∑𝑘−1
𝑖=1

𝐻𝐷(𝑅𝑖,1 ,𝑅𝑖,2 )
𝑛

×100%

(2-1)

Where k and n are the number of chips and response bits, respectively. 𝑅𝑖,1 and 𝑅𝑖,2 are the
responses for challenges C1 and C2 from chip ‘i’, correspondingly.
2.4.2 Inter-distance
A PUF response inter-distance is a distance between two PUF responses from different
PUF instances using the same challenge. Inter-hamming distance between responses is
used to measure the uniqueness of responses. Inter-hamming distance can be calculated by:
𝐻𝐷𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 =

2
𝑘(𝑘−1)

𝑘
∑𝑘−1
𝑖=1 1 ∑𝑗=𝑖+1

𝐻𝐷(𝑅𝑖 ,𝑅𝑗 )
𝑛

×100%

(2-2)

Where n is the number of bits (responses), 𝑅𝑖,𝑗 are the response vectors of two chips, 𝑖 and
𝑗; and 𝑘 is the number of experiments.
2.5 Classification of PUFs
Figure 2.3 shows the classification of PUFs. Based on the number of challenge-response
pairs (CRPs) set, PUFs are classified into weak and strong PUFs. A weak PUF is a type of
PUF which is interrogated with a small set of challenges. An extreme case of a weak PUF
is the one which has only a single challenge such as physically obfuscated key (POK).
Whereas, a strong PUF refers to a PUF which supports an exponentially large number of
challenge set. It is practically infeasibility to build an accurate model of PUF based on
observed CRPs. In this case, if an adversary is given unlimited access to a PUF instance
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Figure 2.3 Classification of PUFs

for a prolonged period of time, it is still almost impossible for an attacker to determine the
PUF responses.
Weak PUFs offer better mechanism to generate secret keys and are hard to attack using
invasive techniques. Typical examples of weak PUFs are SRAM-PUFs [17] and Coating
PUFs [16]. On the other side, strong PUFs are not susceptible for modeling attacks and
therefore, are ideally appropriate for IC identification, fingerprinting and secret key
generation. Typical example of this type of PUFs are arbiter PUF [18], feed-forward arbiter
PUF [19], lightweight secure PUF [20] and optical PUF [16].
Whereas, Controlled PUF (CPUF) is a type of PUF which can only be accessed through a
specific Application Programming Interface (API). The limitation of the strong PUFs are
that adversary can freely apply the challenge to get the response. CPUF resolve this
limitation by restricting the access by using control algorithm. The existing PUF
technology has successfully solved the authentication and secure key generation, but still
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has some untapped potential such as sure bootstrapping which has been solved under
emerging PUF concept by timed authentication PUF, public models PUF [22].
2.6 PUF Implementation
2.6.1 Arbiter PUF
Arbiter PUF (APUF) is a type of delay-based silicon PUF. The idea behind the arbiter PUF
is to exploit the propagation delay variation of delay lines to produce a unique response. It
is composed of two parallel delay lines with N number of delay cells as shown in Figure
2.4. Each delay cell is implemented as a pair of 2-1 multiplexers connected in series whose
selected lines are connected together. It operates based on a race condition between the
rising edges in the delay paths. The arbiter element, which is usually D Flip-Flop,
determines which signal arrived first and correspondingly respond with 0 or 1.

0

0

0

0
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1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

C0

C1

C

N-1

Q

Response

Arbiter
Element

CN

Figure 2.4 APUF basic model

If both paths are designed to have nearly identical normal delays, the result of the race and
arbiter element cannot be unambiguously determined due to the effect of random silicon
process variations on the delay parameters. In case if both the delays are nearly identical
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Figure 2. Error! Bookmark not defined.. APUF basic model

and two edges are applied simultaneously on both paths which will reach the arbiter
element at the same moment. This condition causes the arbiter circuit to go into a
metastable state, i.e. the logic output of the arbiter circuit is temporarily undermined but
after a time when arbiter leaves metastable state and respond with random binary value
which is independent of the outcome of the race. This condition can cause unreliability of
the responses of an arbiter.
2.6.2 Lightweight Secure PUF
The lightweight secure PUF is similar to arbiter PUF but the challenge bit passes through
complicated mapping to increase security. The structure is composed of an input logic
network, interconnect network, parallel arbiter PUFs and an output logic network, as shown
in Figure 2.5. The input network consists of XOR gates to generate different combinations
of challenge bits to each of the PUFs. Similarly, the output network also consists of XOR
gates to combine responses from different PUFs. The advantage of the lightweight secure
PUF is that it is resistive to reverse engineering and emulation attacks due to the confusion
and diffusion properties of hash functions.
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Figure 2.5 Lightweight Secure PUF structure

2.6.3 Feed Forward Arbiter PUFs
Feed forward arbiter PUF works similar to arbiter PUF by exploiting the delay variations.
The difference in feed forward arbiter PUF is that some of the challenges are the result of
racing conditions and are determined with the help of arbiters. As shown in Figure 2.6
shows the output of intermediate MUXs on the signal paths are the input to so-called feedforward arbiter. The output of this arbiter is then fed to the input of another MUX forward
on the signal path. It overcomes the limitation of an arbiter PUF due to the feed-forward
arbiter as it is susceptible to software modeling attacks [21].
Figure 2. 23 Block diagram Figure 3. 1. (a) A two port network representing a
multiplexer. (b) Its equivalent noise free circuit. (c) The equivalent circuit connected
to a sourceof Lightweight Secure PUF

Figure 2. 24 Block diagram Figure 3. 2. (a) A two port network representing a
multiplexer. (b) Its equivalent noise free circuit. (c) The equivalent circuit connected
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to a sourceof Lightweight Secure PUF

Figure 2. 25 Block diagram Figure 3. 3. (a) A two port network representing a

Challenges

D Q
Arbiter

Response

Figure 2.6 Feed-forward arbiter PUF

2.6.4 Ring Oscillator PUFs
Figure 2.7 shows the typical block diagram of a ring oscillator. It consists of two
multiplexers to select ring oscillators for pairwise comparisons. The basic principle of the
ring oscillator is to compare the frequencies of different on chip ring oscillators to generate
CRPs. The output of the MUX is provided to the counter. After comparing the value of the
two counters, the response bit is generated. If the frequency of the first ring oscillator
becomes greater than the second ring oscillator, then the response bit is considered as ‘1’,
otherwise ‘0’. The limitation of RO PUF is the limited number of CRPs. Therefore, it is
restricted to secret key generation for ICs where the response bits are used internally.
Figure 2. 1 Feed-forward arbiter PUF
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Figure 2.7 RO PUF structure

2.6.5 SRAM PUFs
SRAM-PUF is a type of weak PUF which utilizes deep submicron variations that occurs
during semiconductor fabrication. The model of SRAM PUF is shown below, Figure 2.8
(a) shows two cross-coupled inverters each built from two MOSFETs, one from p-MOS
and one from n-MOS. The logic memory functionality of SRAM cell is used from these
inverters where Figure 2.8 (b) shows the common CMOS implementation with six
MOSFETs transistors. Due to these variations, transistors properties become random.
Figure 2. 4 RO PUF structure
When an SRAM is turned ON, every time it has its own preferred state due to the random
difference in the threshold voltages of transistors. However, an adversary can obtain the
fingerprints by exposing SRAM array to a high voltage and temperature as presented in
[16].
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Figure 2. 5 RO PUF structure
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Figure 2.8 (a) Logic circuit of SRAM PUF (b) Electrical circuit of SRAM cell
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2.7 PUF Applications
Based on the properties of PUF, a PUF can be used for reliable identification,
authentication, key storage, and other security applications such as Internet of Things (IoT)
device authentication as shown in Figure 2.9 [22], [23].

Device
Authentication

Secret Key
Generation

PUF
Applications

Random
Number
Generator

Memory
Protection

Figure 2.9 Applications of PUF

2.7.1 Low-Cost Authentication
Figure 2.10 shows the scenario of a chip authentication using PUF. The Challenge
Response Pairs (CRPs) are securely stored in a database of each instance of PUF. To
authenticate an IC, a random set of CRP is selected from the database and applied to the
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IC. The response generated is compared with the response stored in the database to
authenticate the IC. To prevent man-in-middle attacks, challenges are only used once in
the system and then deleted from the database. Therefore, it is necessary to have either a
large number of CRPs or a platform to regenerate new CRPs for the system.

Supply Chain/
Environment

Database

Serial #: 123456
RFID Tag ID: 121212
Challenge Response
43692768
34569825 25895361
59348685 43692768
....
....

RFID TAG ID
Challenge

Response
Result

1. Send RFID Tag ID
2. Receive Challenge, send
challenge to RFID Tag
3. Receive response from
RFID tag, send to server
4. Wait for authentication
result from server

Figure 2.10 Unclonable RFIDs approach to authentication

Mutual authentication to secure RFID tags by utilizing PUF and Linear Feedback Shift
Register (LFSR) to identify both readers and tags successfully is presented in [24]. To
securely activate IC and user authentication, PUF is used as proposed in [25]. Pier et al. in
[26] presents PUF-based RFID tags for authentication and used error-correcting codes
(ECC) to support the use of real PUF tags.
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2.7.2 Cryptographic Key Generation
A cryptographic primitive requires every bit of a key to remain constant. However, PUF
cannot guarantee 100% reproducibility of a response for an applied challenge under
varying environmental conditions. Figure 2.11 shows firstly, an ECC technique used to
ensure that a PUF produces the same output under environmental condition variation.
Secondly, the cryptographic key is generated by converting the PUF output response using
a key generation.

Figure 2.11 Cryptographic key generation using PUF [27]

In the first step of initialization, an output response is generated from PUF circuit and then
the error encoding syndrome for the generated response is computed and saved. To regenerate the key, firstly response is generated from PUF circuit and this response is fed to
the ECC decoding along with the syndrome from initialization step to correct any error if
required. In addition, syndrome reveals PUF delay circuit output information. For
cryptographic operations, the output of the ECC can be simply hashed to desired length of
k to generate key.
Figure 2. 13 Cryptographic key generation using PUF [29]
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2.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed the properties and implementation of different PUF
circuits. We provide simplified explanation of the work which has been reported in
literature. The study shows that PUF is subjected to operating conditions such as power
supply, temperature and noise. However, a detail analysis was required to conclude that
how much these conditions can affect the performance parameters and CRPs of a PUF. To
understand the PUF at practical stage, it requires fabrication of a chip. To avoid the long
fabrication process, study analyzed the PUF and its performance on FPGA platform. Due
to the rigid constrains of FPGA, literature highlighted the need of delay measurement
module to measure the imbalance of the implemented circuit. The issue with this
measurement module is that it can also be affected by the rigid constrains of the FPGA and
can lower the accuracy of the system. Hence, to resolve the issue of rigid constrains and
measurement module, we presented a new easy method to implement PUF circuit on FPGA
platform without the requirement of an extra module. We used the available tools of the
FPGA to read and minimize the misalignment.
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Chapter -3
Reliability of Physical Unclonable Function under Temperature
and Supply Voltage Variations

3.1 Introduction
Security for communication networks has been a top priority for system designers and
policy makers. In the past, the hardware was considered the source of trust while the
application layer presumed the main source of security concerns. Security measures were
commonly implemented using software to protect systems. However, the notion that
hardware is the source of trust is not valid anymore due to the outsourcing of semiconductor
manufacturing services. Physical layer security will become increasingly important as the
threats of infected hardware continue to grow.
Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) has emerged as a basic hardware security primitive.
A PUF is intentionally designed to become a function of process variation to generate a
unique signature. It is interrogated by a set of challenges to generate a set of unique
responses. Every challenge set for a particular PUF has to generate a unique signature
which depends primarily on the fabrication process randomness. PUF can be utilized for
reliable identification, authentication, key storage and other security applications [1, 2]
such as Internet of Things (IoT) authentication.
The design objective for a PUF may not be fully met due to fluctuation of supply voltage,
temperature and aging. Among the factors affecting PUF behavior, supply voltage and
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temperature variations are important and cannot be ignored. Supply voltage variation over
time for certain applications such as IoT sensors is unavoidable. PUF performance is
evaluated based on several parameters such as unclonability, unpredictability, randomness,
robustness, sensitivity, and reliability [3-5]. The effects of varying temperature on the
unpredictability and stability of a PUF are discussed in [6]. A Programmable Delay Lines
(PDL) is proposed in [6] to reduce the noise impact on the PUF responses. The effects of
temperature variation and aging on PUF stability and reliability are discussed in [7-9].
However, a detailed analysis to quantify how temperature and supply voltage fluctuations
affect a PUF reliability has not been presented in these works.
Different types of PUF have been reported in the literature such as Arbiter-PUF [10], RingOscillator-PUF [10, 11], and SRAM-PUF [12]. A typical arbiter PUF exploits the
propagation delay variation to produce a unique response. An arbiter PUF is composed of
two parallel delay lines as shown in Figure 2.4. It operates based on a race between the
speeds of rising edges in the delay paths. The arbiter element determines which signal
arrived first and correspondingly respond with 0 or 1. In addition, PUF reliability depends
on the performance parameters of the arbiter. For instance, the setup-time and the holdtime of the arbiter have a considerable impact on the reliability. As shown in Figure 3.1,
for a reliable response the data has to be stable for a certain period of time known as setup
time before the rising edge of the clock and must remain stable for a time period known as
hold-time after the rising edge.
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Figure 3.1 Effect of setup/hold time on proper operation of arbiter

It is a common practice to design and fabricate a PUF first and then take necessary
measures to compensate the effects of supply and temperature variations on its
performance parameters. However, such a method cannot always solve the problem. If the
effects of supply voltage and temperature variations become comparable to the effects of
process variations on propagation delay, the available measures to compensate them cannot
easily solve the problem. A PUF has to be designed to minimize the effects of supply
voltage and temperature to ensure its reliability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The analytical analysis of temperature effect
on PUF reliability is covered in section 3.2. Section 3.3 presents the impact of supply
voltage variations on PUF reliability. Simulation results are presented in section 3.4 and
section 3.5 summarizes the conclusions.
Figure 3. 5 Effect of setup/hold time on proper operation of arbiter
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3.2 Effect of Temperature Variation on PUF Reliability
The propagation delay of a delay cell changes with temperature due to circuit noise.
Consequently, the reliability of a PUF is affected by temperature variations. To clarify how
circuit noise affects the behavior of a PUF, a multiplexer which is the building block of an
arbiter PUF is analyzed. Figure 3.2 (a) shows a noisy multiplexer and its equivalent two
port network in which the sources of noise are referred to the input. The spectral power
density of the thermal noise in Figure 3.2 (b) is represented by a current source, 𝐼̅𝑛2 , and a
2
̅̅̅
voltage source, 𝑣
𝑛 . If a source, 𝑉𝑠 , with resistance of 𝑅𝑠 is connected to the multiplexer as

indicated in Figure 3.2 (c), the input voltage can be calculated from:
𝑅𝑖𝑛
2 = (𝑣
2
̅̅̅̅
̅̅̅
̅̅̅2 ̅2 2
𝑣𝑖𝑛
𝑠 + 𝑣𝑛 + 𝐼𝑛 𝑅𝑠 ) (𝑅 +𝑅 )
𝑠

𝑖𝑛

2

(3-1)

where 𝑅𝑖𝑛 is the input resistance of the two port network. Thus, the equivalent noise power
2
̅̅̅̅̅̅
spectral density, 𝑣
𝑛,𝑒𝑞 , can be determined from:

𝑅𝑖𝑛
2
̅̅̅̅̅̅
̅̅̅2 ̅2 2
𝑣
𝑛,𝑒𝑞 = (𝑣𝑛 + 𝐼𝑛 𝑅𝑠 ) (𝑅 +𝑅 )
𝑖𝑛

2

𝑠

(3-2)

To determine the power of noise at the multiplexer’s input, the equivalent noise has to be
integrated over the bandwidth. Assuming parasitic capacitance of 𝐶𝑝 at the multiplexer’s
∞ ̅̅̅̅̅̅
2
input, the noise power, 𝑃𝑛 , is given by 𝑃𝑛 = ∫0 𝑣
𝑛,𝑒𝑞 𝑑𝑓 from which the noise root mean

square, 𝑣𝑛,𝑟𝑚𝑠 , can be calculated. The presence of noise voltage at the multiplexer’s input
corrupts the switching time and alters the propagation delay.
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Figure 3.2 (a) A two port network representing a multiplexer. (b) Its equivalent noise
free circuit. (c) The equivalent circuit connected to a source

In an ideal case, for a logic gate, the switching happens when the input signal crosses the
threshold of VDD/2 as indicated in Figure 3.3 (a). However, in the presence of noise, as
shown in Figure 3.3 (b), the switching can happen in an interval defined by:
𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝑉𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 < 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥

(3-3)

where
𝑉𝑚𝑖𝑛 =

𝑉𝐷𝐷
2

− 𝑣𝑛,𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘 and 𝑉𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
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𝑉𝐷𝐷
2

+ 𝑣𝑛,𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘

(3-4)

𝑣𝑛,𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘 is the peak value of the noise voltage. Assuming normal distribution, the noise peak
value and rms value are related by:
𝑣𝑛,𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘 ≈ 3𝑣𝑛,𝑖𝑛,𝑟𝑚𝑠

(3-5)

Therefore, the propagation delay for the multiplexer cannot be defined by a fixed value. It
can take a random value within a time interval depending on the instantaneous level of the
noise voltage.
Figure 3.4 shows the result of noise simulation for a multiplexer implemented in Cadence
environment using CMOS 0.18µm technology. Figure 3.4 (a) shows the power spectral
density of the noise at the multiplexer output. The power of the noise, which is obtained
through integration of the noise spectral density, is shown in Figure 3.4 (b) and the rms
noise voltage is indicated in Figure 3.4 (c). It can be seen that the rms noise voltage for the
implemented multiplexer exceeds 1mV which can affect the propagation delay
considerably.
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Figure 3.3 Effect of noise on propagation delay of a multiplexer. (a) Without noise
where the propagation delay is fixed. (b) With noise where the propagation delay
varies between Min and Max values
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(a)

(b)
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(c)
Figure 3.4 Noise response of a multiplexer. (a) Power spectral density. (b) Noise
power. (c) rms noise voltage.

3.3 Effect of Supply Voltage Variation on PUF Reliability
In this section, the effect of supply voltage variations on propagation delay of delay cells
in an arbiter PUF is evaluated. A basic multiplexer and a delay line are used to show
propagation delay variation with ± 10% supply voltage fluctuations. The output resistance
of the multiplexer varies significantly during the input transition. Neglecting the second
order effects, the average output resistance can be determined by [13]:
𝑅𝑒𝑞 ≈

3 𝑉𝐷𝐷
4 𝐼𝐷𝑆𝐴𝑇

(1 −

7
9

𝜆𝑉𝐷𝐷 )

(3-6)
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Figure 3. 9 Noise response of a multiplexer. (a) Power spectral density. (b) Noise

where

𝐼𝐷𝑆𝐴𝑇 = 𝑘 ′

𝑊
𝐿

((𝑉𝐷𝐷 − 𝑉𝑇 )𝑉𝐷𝑆𝐴𝑇 −

2
𝑉𝐷𝑆𝐴𝑇

2

)

(3-7)

It can be seen from (6) that the average output resistance is a function of V DD. During the
output transition, the parasitic capacitance at the output node, 𝐶𝑝 , is charged through VDD
with a time constant defined by Req 𝐶𝑝 . Simulation results in section 3.4 indicate that the
effect of supply voltage variations can be comparable to the effects of process variations
on propagation delay of logic gates.
3.4 Simulation Results
To analyze the effect of temperature and supply voltage variations on PUF reliability, a
basic arbiter PUF with 10 delay cells was implemented in Cadence environment using
CMOS 0.18µm technology to evaluate the PUF reliability. A module consisting of 10 delay
cells is enough to perform simulations and estimate the average delay per cell. Further, the
result is verifies through the normal distribution.
The implemented arbiter PUF shown in Figure 2.4, was used to perform simulations and
to evaluate the effect of process variations. Figure 3.5 presents the results of corner analysis
at different corners of fast-fast (FF), typical-typical (TT), and slow-slow (SS), where fast
and slow corner exhibit higher and lower carrier mobilities than typical, i.e. normal. It can
be seen that the propagations delay varies up to 31.504ps for a single multiplexer and
378.2ps for the delay line. The circuit used to evaluate the effect of process variations on
the propagation delay was used to determine the effects of temperature and supply
variations. Figure 3.6 shows simulation results for ±10% supply voltage variation. It can
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Figure 3.5 Simulation results to evaluate the effect of process variations on the
propagation delay of a multiplexer. (a) Output response of a MUX to an input
indicating different propagations delay for FF, TT and SS corners. (b) Output response
of a delay line containing ten multiplexers indicating propagation delay variations at
different corners.
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Figure 3.6 Effect of supply voltage variation on propagation delay of logic gates. (a) A
multiplexer. (b) A delay line containing ten multiplexers.

be seen that the propagation delay of the delay line varies by 87.426ps. Assuming a normal
distribution for the propagation delay due to the process variation with 6σ = 378ps, the
effect of supply variation on the reliability can be calculated. It can be seen in Figure 3.7
that the area under the Gaussian distribution which indicates the PUF reliability reduces to
less than 49% due to 10% supply voltage variation. Therefore, supply voltage fluctuations
can reduce the set of reliable PUF CRPs considerably.
(a)
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-43.7

43.7

Figure 3.7 Reliability reduction for an arbiter PUF due to 10% supply voltage
variation

Simulation results for temperature variations in Figure 3.8 indicate that the propagation
delay increases as the temperature rises. It can be seen that the propagation delay of delay
line varies by 101.7ps when the temperature rises from -40ºC to +70ºC. The effects of
temperature variations on the PUF reliability can be determined by using the same method
used to calculate the effects of supply voltage variation. As shown in Figure 3.9, in this
case the area under the Gaussian distribution drops to lower than 42% which indicates that
the PUF reliability is effects by temperature variations significantly.
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Figure 3.8 Propagation delay versus temperature for a delay line containing 10
multiplexers.
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Figure 3.9 Reduction in area due to temperature variation
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Simulation results indicate that both temperature and supply voltage variations can
undermine the reliability of an arbiter PUF considerably to the degree that they cannot be
easily compensated after fabrication. To minimize these effects, the PUF circuity has to be
designed properly. The first stage in a delay line has the maximum effect on the overall
output noise. Therefore, it is reasonable to utilize low noise design techniques to implement
a low noise delay cell as the first stage in a delay line for an arbiter PUF. There are also
known circuit design methodologies to implement supply voltage independent circuits.
Figure 3.10 shows a simple circuit of supply-independent biasing, which includes two
current mirrors using PMOS and NMOS transistors. The idea is if IREF does not change
with respect to VDD, then Iout remain independent of supply voltage [14].

Figure 3.10 Simple circuit of supply-independent
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Using both negative Temperature Coefficient (TC) circuits and positive TC circuits [14] a
temperature independent gate can be designed. Such temperature independent gates can be
utilized to design reliable PUFs.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper presents a detail analysis on how supply voltage and temperature variations can
undermine PUF reliability and reduce the set of reliable challenges and responses.
Simulation results using Cadence environment indicate that the set of CPRs can decrease
by more than 51% if the supply varies by ±10%. Likewise, temperature variations from 40ºC to +70ºC reduces a PUF reliability significantly by more than 58%. Such a
considerable reduction of reliability cannot be readily fixed after fabrication. Circuit design
techniques have to be employed to address the problem prior to fabrication. To lower the
effect of temperature, the first stage of delay lines in a PUF has to be designed as a low
noise delay cell.
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Chapter-4
APUF Implementation on FPGA Platform

Implementing PUF on FPGAs platform has been addressed in many research papers. To
the greatest, PUF performance parameters for different types of PUF have been studied.
However, few papers focus on a practical solution for PUF implementation on FPGAs. In
this chapter, we present an implementation method of APUF on an Altera FPGA without
using an extra measurement module. Experiments are performed using FPGA technology
to determine how much misalignment can be tolerated to achieve a high reliability.
4.1 Introduction
To implement an APUF on FPGA, we need to create a delay chain consisting of a number
of MUXs as shown in Figure 2.4. However, it is hard to implement a symmetrical structure
on FPGAs since FPGA synthesis tools are designed to optimize implemented circuits and
remove redundant circuits. To overcome this problem, LCELL are used which are not
optimized by Altera synthesis tool, hence it can be used to design delay lines composed of
delay cells. This approach fits well for RO-PUF and TERO-PUF but design of APUF
requires MUXs.
PUF implementation on an FPGA is challenging due to the placement and routing (PAR)
tools in the FPGA rigid fabric and interconnection structure. A symmetric routing in most
cases is infeasible and asymmetry in routing can lead to bias and predictable responses
which reduces the response entropy [1].
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4.2 Altera EP2C5
An APUF was implemented on Altera Cyclone II (EP2C5T144C8N) in this work. This
board allows an easy way to design and test a PUF. This board is widely used to design
advanced applications. It has a large number of logic elements (LE) along with I/O pins.
The board is composed of flash, 50MHz active on-board oscillator, Joint Test Active Group
(JTAG) and Universal Serial Bus (USB) blaster port, and I/O pins including LEDs, push
button [2].
4.3 Cyclone II LE Architecture
Figure 4.1 shows the LE structure of Cyclone II, which consists of four-input LUT,
programmable register, carry chain, and register chain. This LUT is a function generator
of four variables, used to design different functions. The LE operates in either the normal
mode or in the arithmetic mode. The normal mode best suits for general logic applications
and combinational functions. Whereas, the arithmetic mode is used for designing adders,
counter, accumulator and comparators [3].
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Figure 4.1 Cyclone II logic element structure [4]

4.4 Design Requirements and Implementation
To implement APUF on FPGA, we utilized the diagram/schematic file. To design a delay
line, it is required to copy the same circuit; for this an elementary symbol of a delay cell is
created as shown in Figure 4.2 (a). A symbol consisting of a pair of 2-1 MUX in parallel
whose inputs are cross connected and the select lines are connected was created as
presented in Figure 4.2 (b). The delay lines were designed using the delay cell symbol as
shown in Figure. 2.4.
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(a)

(b)
Figure 4.2 (a) Elementary symbol of a delay cell (b) Symbol compact pair of 2-1
MUX whose inputs are cross connected and selectors are connected together
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In this work, a 64-bit challenge PUF was implemented to generate 16-bit responses. Figure
4.3 shows the Register Transfer Level (RTL) view for 1-bit response of the implemented
design.

Figure 4.3 RTL view of 64-bit challenge with 1- bit response
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Figure 4.4 Resource property editor window view of delay cell and DFF
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Figure 4.4 shows the LE view for the last delay cell and a Delay Flip-Flop (DFF) in the
resource property editor window, where MUXU and MUXL are the last multiplexers of
upper and lower delay lines, correspondingly. Here MUX function is implemented using
Look Up Table (LUT) whose output is connected to a DFF to generate the response.
PAR of logic elements on an FPGA has to be constrained since it can affect the output
result. In addition, it can affect the PUF efficiency at four different sections listed below
and shown in Figure 4.5.
1. Routing before the first delay cell,
2. Routing inside the delay cells,
3. Routing between the delay cells, and
4. Routing after the last delay cell.
The result of the automatic PAR is represented in Figure 4.6. It has to be noted that the
PUF building blocks in the chip planner are randomly placed in LUTs of a number of LEs.
This automatic PAR causes imbalance in the delay lines and makes the circuit biased and
predictable. However, it is hard to calculate the exact percentage of imbalance as it depends
on the type of FPGA board, software version and circuit design.
To overcome the undesired effects of PAR on PUF performance, an extra measurement
module is commonly utilized to fix the imbalance by adding extra delay cells in the top
delay line. This measurement module increases the area and complexity of implementation.
In this work, we presented a new and easy solution to the imbalance created by PAR.
Instead of adding an extra module, we exploited the chip planner tool available in the FPGA
platform to check the PAR at the initial stage to fix the imbalance.
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Figure 4.6 Random placing of MUX and arbiter element on the chip planner

Chip planner is a tool provided by Altera which allows a quick view of the logic cells on
the chip. It provides visual display of post-place-and-route design mapped to the device
structure. This tool allows users to create, move and delete logic cells.
This tool is used to manually place the logic cells in the desired location to minimize the
imbalance between the lines. LogicLock Region (LLR) and Design Partition (DP) from
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Figure 4.7 Design after partition in LLR
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Figure 4.8 Result of one manual placement
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Chip Planner tool are consumed to define specific regions to delay cells on the chip. The
design is initially divided into individual partitions at DP level based on the system
complexity and user need; then logic cells are locked in the desired LEs using LLR.
To minimize the misalignment between the upper and lower delay line, we placed the logic
cells next to each other manually to test the uniqueness and reliability parameters of APUF.
Figure 4.7 represents the physical allocation of 16-bits response APUF which is placed at
different locations in the chip planner to check the propagation delay difference between
PUFs with respect to the location, where Figure 4.8 presents the closer look of placed 1bit PUF instance.
4.5 Experimental Results
In this section, the results are observed by burning the code on Cyclone II
(EP2C5T144C8N) board. Figure 4.9 shows the utilized board.

Figure 4.9 Cyclone II FPGA board used for testing
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The presented solution resulted in a PUF with delay imbalance of less than 8ps on average.
The plot in Figure 4.10 shows the imbalance between 16-bit responses, where the blue and
red colors indicate the results of imbalances between the upper and the lower delay lines
before the arbiter for automatic placement and after placing the delay cells manually,
correspondingly. It is clear from the plot that automatic PAR can result in minimum and
maximum misalignment which cannot be ignored. The results of the proposed solution are
between 5ps and 17ps for misalignment. Hence, this misalignment can also affect the
reliability which has been examined further.

Figure 4.10 Result of propagation delay for random and fixed 16-bit PUF
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Figure 4.11 Result of observing ‘1’ as response after locking them at fixed places for
five PUFs

To test the reliability parameter, the same challenge was applied 100 times and the response
bits equal to ‘1’ were counted. Figure 4.11 shows the result of observing ‘1’ for 5 PUF
responses. It can be seen that at most the response is ‘1’ but for 2 PUF instances, at the end,
response switched from ‘1’ to ‘0’.
We also applied 100 random challenges and repeated each for 10 times to test the reliability
and randomness of the proposed design. When the response bit is ‘1’ for more than half of
the challenges, the response was considered as ‘1’. Figure 4.12 shows the probability of
obtaining ‘1’ for 5 responses. It can be seen that the distribution is unbiased towards ‘1’.
The probability of these responses for random challenges is around 50%, which is close to
an ideal case.
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Ideal Stage

Figure 4.12 Probability of observing ‘1’ as response bit for random challenges versus
5 response bits

To ensure the uniqueness of the responses, the hamming distance is calculated and shown
in Figure 4.13. Table 4.1 compares the results of this work with the previous work. The
proposed solution has less misalignment as compared to the reported solution and can be
implemented without the requirement of an extra hardware module. Moreover, it is easy to
implement and do not require tuning block.
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Figure 4.13 Hamming distance of output response bits

Table 1: Comparison with pervious work
[21]

Proposed Method

Misalignment

Average 9 ps

Average 8 ps

Extra hardware module

Yes

No

Need tuning

Yes

No

Reliability

Close to 50 %

Average 50 %

Implementation

Complicated

Easy
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4.6 Conclusion
A proper placement-and-routing of logic cells on FPGA platform is very important for PUF
implementation, as this can cause a delay imbalance and in worst condition can affect the
functionality of the design. To measure the imbalance of the implemented circuit on FPGA,
an extra module is commonly used, however this extra hardware module can also add a
delay imbalance to the circuit. In this work, we presented a method to measure and fix the
imbalance without adding an extra module. Instead of automatic PAR, we manually placed
the logic cells on the chip to ensure symmetrical PUF delay line and PUF reliability. The
misalignment was successfully controlled using chip planner tool. This work was
conducted for APUF, however other types of PUF can also be implemented using the same
methodology. Experimental results indicate that the implementation of the circuit at
different parts of the chip changes the response set.
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Chapter -5
Conclusions and Future Work
5.1 Summary
Hardware security and trust has become a challenge, due to increasing vulnerable to
adversary attacks. In this thesis, we looked at the design of an Arbiter Physical Unclonable
Function that enable reliable authentication of integrated circuits. Further, we studied the
properties which help to derive the PUF design such as uniqueness, reliability, randomness
and tamper evidence. In addition, we studied the designs of PUF circuits and their
applications. PUF functionality depends on the performance metrics of the CRPs and these
parameters are influenced by environmental conditions. To test the accuracy of APUF,
reliability and uniqueness simulations were performed under fluctuating power supply and
temperature using Cadence environment 0.18µm technology. We also analyzed how these
factors reduce the database of CRPs.
Another way to test the accuracy of the PUF is by implementing it on FPGA environment
but there are several challenges. It is important to make sure that the implemented PUF is
balanced and has same symmetry which requires to measure the propagation delay of the
delay lines. To measure the propagation delay an extra hardware module is proposed by
the literature. However, this measurement module can also affect the accuracy of the PUF.
To test the accuracy of APUF on FPGA platform, we utilized Chip Planner software
available inside the FPGA tool instead of an extra hardware module.
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5.2 Conclusion
The results conducted using Cadence tool indicated that more than 23% of the CRPs
reduced from the database due to ±10% of power supply variations. In addition, around
26% of the reduction in CRPs was noticed in the case of temperature variation from -40ºC
to +70ºC. Such a reduction was huge and cannot be ignored. Therefore, it is imperative that
if supply or temperature variations may occur, circuit elements specifically designed to be
robust to such variations be employed in the design of PUFs. The result of this work has
been accepted in MWSCAS-2018 for publication.
In addition, we implemented APUF on Altera FPGA platform by using Chip Planner tool
available in FPGA and achieved to 8ps of misalignment with 5ps from the best case and
17ps for the worst case. Hence, this approach of implementing PUF designs on FPGAs
provide better performance and is much easier to implement. The results have been
prepared to be submitted in journal for publication in the field of security.
5.3 Future Work
In this thesis, measurement results for the FPGA implementation were conducted under the
same environmental conditions. As presented in chapter 3, varying operating conditions
can affect the performance of PUF. Measurement results under varying operating
conditions are required. Moreover, performance evaluation for a PUF designed using delay
cells containing temperature and voltage resilient circuits can be a good topic for future
works.
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